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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF CASE

NATURE OF CASE.

This case is a dispute over the return of earnest money following the termination of a an
agreement for the purchase and sale of a storage unit facility. The dispute is primarily focused
upon which provisions in the purchase and sale agreement govern return of earnest money
following termination of the contract based upon title issues.

The Agreement, including

addendums, contains language providing for the return of earnest money to the buyer in two
circumstances: 1) if the buyer terminates the Agreement before February 1, 2018, and 2) if the
buyer objects to title issues within 15 days of receiving the title commitment. River Range, the
buyer, timely terminated the contract pursuant to the title commitment provision, but after
February I, 2018. The district court determined on a motion for summary judgment filed by the
seller that buyer was not entitled to the return of its earnest money because it found the two
provisions unambiguously in conflict. The court determined based upon the conflict that the
provision for termination by February 1, 2018 controlled because it is contained in an addendum
drafted by seller's attorney for the transaction rather than the preprinted form. This appeal is taken
by buyer from the district court's grant of summary in favor of seller. The provisions of the
Agreement do not directly conflict and can be read together in a way that respects the intent of the
parties.
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B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS.

On June 20, 2018, River Range LLC ("River Range") filed a Complaint in this action in
the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State ofldaho, Ada County Case No. CV0l18-11353. (CR_000006.)
On November 8, 2018, Citadel filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (CR_000018.)
On April 15, 2019 the District Court Judge, Nancy A. Baskin, issued a Memorandum
Decision and Order on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, granting Citadel's Motion.
(CR_000190.) Judgment was entered on April 19, 2019, in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff
on Count I and Count II of Plaintiffs Complaint. (CR_000229.)
On May 31, 2019, River Range filed a Notice of Appeal.
C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.

On or about January 23, 2018, Plaintiff River Range LLC ("River Range") entered into a
Commercial/Investment Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement (hereinafter, "PSA") with
Defendant Citadel ("Citadel") for the purchase of Citadel's real property located at 2851 S. Federal
Way, Boise, Ada County, Idaho 83705 ("Property"). (CR_000051-63.)
On January 23, 2019, the parties executed an Addendum #1 to the PSA, titled Price
Escalation Addendum to Purchase and Sale Agreement. (CR_000065.) They also executed
Addendum No. 2 to the PSA. (CR_000067-71.) The PSA as modified by Addendum No. 2
provides that River Range deposit an Earnest Money Payment of Fifty Thousand Dollars
($50,000.00). (CR_000067, ,-i3.) The Earnest Money was paid by River Range. The PSA and
Addendum No. 2 provide for a number of contingencies that could be exercised during a general
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due diligence period ending on February 21, 2018. (CR_00005163; CR_000067, 16.) In addition
to the general Due Diligence Period which was specified by date in the contract, there is a separate
contingency for title issues. The deadline for title objections is not specified by date, but rather is
specified relative to Buyer's receipt of the preliminary title commitment. Section 12 of the PSA
provides:

PRELIMINARY TITLE COMMITMENT: No later than the Seller Disclosure
Deadline, SELLER shall furnish to BUYER, at SELLER' s sole cost and expense,
a preliminary commitment of a title insurance policy showing the condition of the
title to said PROPERTY, together with a copy of each instrument, agreement or
document listed as an exception to title in the title commitment that is reasonably
available to SELLER. BUYER shall have fifteen (15) business days from receipt
of the preliminary commitment within which to object in writing to the condition
of the title as set forth in the preliminary commitment. If BUYER does not object,
BUYER shall be deemed to have accepted the conditions of the title. It is agreed
that if the title of said PROPERTY is not marketable, or cannot be made so within
ten (10) business days after notice containing a written statement of defect is
delivered to SELLER, then BUYER, at BUYER's option, may either :
(a) terminate this agreement by written notice to the SELLER, in which
BUYER's Earnest Money deposit shall be returned to BUYER and neither
party shall have any further rights, obligations or liabilities except as expressly
set forth in this Agreement; or (b) continue with this Agreement and, if closing
occurs, accept title subject to the uncured title defects other than monetary liens.
SELLER covenants and agrees that all monetary liens shall be removed by
SELLER at closing or insured against by the title insurer, whether or not BUYER
has designated such monetary liens as title defects.
(CR_000052, Exh. A, 112.) (Emphasis added).
The Seller Disclosure Deadline was January 29, 2018. (CR_000067, 16.) River Range
first received a title commitment from Citadel on February 16, 2018, more than two weeks after
the Seller Disclosure Deadline. (CR_000127, 15.) The title commitment was dated January 16,
2018. (CR_000129-145.) Upon receipt of the title commitment, River Range timely objected in
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writing to various conditions of the title by letter dated March 12, 2018. (CR_000075.) Citadel
responded to the objections by email dated March 16, 2018, but failed to substantively or
adequately address a number of the objections. Defendant's responses put the onus on River Range
to attempt to resolve the issues with the title company, and were inadequate. (CR_000079-81;
CR_000083; CR_000127, ,rs.)
When Citadel failed to adequately address the Buyer's title concerns, River Range timely
terminated the contract pursuant to Section 12 of the PSA by email dated March 26, 2018.
(CR_000102.) The email requested the return of Buyer's Earnest Money deposit. Id. Citadel
refused to return the Earnest Money Deposit to River Range. (CR_000l 10.)
Il.

1.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Whether the trial court erred in holding that the Agreement is not ambiguous and

therefore Addendum No. 2 eliminated the right to have the earnest money refunded after
February 21, 2018 for any reason including issues with the preliminary title commitment.
2.

Whether the trial court erred in holding that River Range waived its right to terminate the

purchase due to the late receipt of the preliminary title commitment when it did not exercise its
termination right by February 21, 2018.
3.

Whether the trial court erred in holding as a matter of law that Citadel did not breach its

duty to act in good faith and that its conduct did not rise to a breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing; and
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4.

Whether the trial court erred in granting Citadel an award of attorney fees based on the

granting of the summary judgment in favor of Citadel.

5.

Is River Range entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal?

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

On appeal, an appellate court exercises de novo review of a grant of summary
judgment, and the standard of review is the same as the standard used by the trial court in ruling
on a motion for summary judgment. AED, Inc. v. KDC Invs., LLC, 155 Idaho 159, 307 P.3d 176
(2013). When considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must consider "whether the
evidence, when construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, presents a genuine
issue of material fact or shows that the moving party is not entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw."
Valiant Idaho, LLCv. VP Inc., 164 Idaho 314,325,429 P.3d 855,866 (2018) (citingKiebertv.
Goss, 144 Idaho 225, 228, 159 P .3d 862, 865 (2007). "The moving party bears the burden of

proving the absence of material facts." Id. "Once the moving party establishes the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to show the existence of
a genuine issue of material fact." Id. "A non-moving party must come forward with evidence by
affidavit or otherwise that contradicts the evidence submitted by the moving party, and that
establishes the existence of a material issue of disputed fact." Id.

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - 7

IV.

ARGUMENT

A.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE AGREEMENT
IS NOT AMBIGUOUS AND THEREFORE ADDENDUM NO. 2 ELIMINATED
THE RIGHT TO HAVE THE EARNEST MONEY REFUNDED AFTER
FEBRUARY 21, 2018 FOR ANY REASON INCLUDING ISSUES WITH THE
PRELIMINARY TITLE.

The trial court determined that the Purchase and Sale Agreement is not ambiguous. This
determination lead the court to two conclusions.

First, because the court determined the

Agreement is not ambiguous, the court did not consider any disputed material facts related to the
parties' intent. Second, the court found that the language of Addendum 2 was unambiguously in
conflict with and therefore controlled over provisions in the form agreement.

The court's

determination that the contract is not ambiguous was in error because the language of Addendum
2 is subject to reasonably conflicting interpretations. Because the language of Addendum 2 that
is at issue can be interpreted in multiple ways, it can also be read together with the terms of the
form agreement in a manner that gives effect to the intent of the parties.
A contract is ambiguous if it is reasonably subject to conflicting interpretations. Doyle v.
Ortega, 125 Idaho 458, 872 P.2d 721 (1994). If a contract is deemed to be ambiguous, the

interpretation of the contract document is a question of fact which focuses on the intent of the
parties. Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 147 P.3d 100 (Ct. App. 2006). Whether a contract is
ambiguous is a question of law over which an appellate court exercises free review. Id.
The Purchase and Sale Agreement sets forth two distinct provisions for terminating the
Agreement with the return of earnest money to River Range. First, the Agreement can be
terminated "for any reason" during the due diligence period and earnest money returned.
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Addendum No. 2 provides in part that "[t]he Earnest Money is fully refundable to Buyer until the
Due Diligence Deadline. The Earnest Money will become nonrefundable if Buyer's failure to
terminate this Agreement by the Due Diligence Deadline for any reason . ... " (CR_000067, if3.)
Second, the PSA in section 12 provides in part that"[ n ]o later than the Seller Disclosure Deadline,
SELLER shall furnish to BUYER, . . . . a preliminary commitment of a title insurance policy
showing the condition of the title to said PROPERTY, .... BUYER shall have fifteen (15) business
days from receipt of the preliminary commitment within which to object in writing to the condition
of the title as set forth in the preliminary commitment. If BUYER does not object, BUYER shall
be deemed to have accepted the conditions of the title. It is agreed that if the title of said
PROPERTY is not marketable, or cannot be made so within ten (10) business days after notice
containing a written statement of defect is delivered to SELLER, then BUYER, at BUYER' s
option, may either: (a) terminate this agreement by written notice to the SELLER, in which
BUYER's Earnest Money deposit shall be returned to BUYER .... " (CR_000052, Exh. A,

,r

12.) (Emphasis added).
Based upon its ruling that the contract is not ambiguous, the district court determined that
paragraph 3 of Addendum No. 2 conflicts with the provisions of Section 12, and therefore per
Idaho Code§ 29-109, the language of Addendum No. 2 controls.
Idaho Code § 29-109 provides that:
Where a contract is partly written and partly printed, or where part of it is written
or printed under the special directions of the parties, and with a special view to their
intention, and the remainder is copied from a form originally prepared without
special reference to the particular parties and the particular contract in question, the
written parts control the printed parts, and the parts which are purely original
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control those which are copied from a form, and if the two are absolutely
repugnant, the latter must be so far disregarded.
Idaho Code§ 29-109. (Emphasis added.)
The provisions of Addendum No. 2 are neither repugnant nor inconsistent with the specific
provisions of Section 12 of the PSA.

They simply apply to two different contingencies.

Consequently, Idaho Code § 29-109 is not applicable. Moreover, if Defendant's counsel believed
that Section 12 was inconsistent with the intent of Addendum No. 2, it would have been explicitly
dealt with rather than left to LC. 29-109. Addendum No. 2 was drafted by Seller's attorney based
on directions received from Citadel. (CR_000043, 14.) It modified specific provisions of the
Purchase and Sale Agreement. It specifically provides that "[a]ll terms of the foregoing agreement
not modified by this Addendum remain unchanged." (CR_000047, 16; CR_000067, Exh. C.) To
the extent that Citadel wanted to modify a section in the original Agreement, it is clear they knew
how to do so and Addendum No. 2 specifies which provisions were to be modified. Every
paragraph in Addendum No. 2 specifies which section of the PSA it is intended to change.
Addendum No. 2 modifies Section 2, 4, 6, 7, 9, 15, 20, 21, 25 and 29, and adds a new Section
l 7(C). There is no modification to Section 12 specified.
The PSA provides separate and a distinct time frames and provisions for general due
diligence and title issues. During the due diligence period the Buyer could terminate "for any
reason." The general due diligence period in the contract was specified by date. (CR_000067,
Exh. C, ,I6.) General due diligence under the contract ended on the Due Diligence Deadline of

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF-10

February 21, 2018. The deadline for title objections is not specified by date, but rather is specified
relative to Buyer's receipt of the preliminary title commitment. Section 12 of the PSA provides:

PRELIMINARY TITLE COMMITMENT: No later than the Seller Disclosure
Deadline, SELLER shall furnish to BUYER, at SELLER' s sole cost and expense,
a preliminary commitment of a title insurance policy showing the condition of the
title to said PROPERTY, together with a copy of each instrument, agreement or
document listed as an exception to title in the title commitment that is reasonably
available to SELLER. BUYER shall have fifteen (15) business days from receipt
of the preliminary commitment within which to object in writing to the condition
of the title as set forth in the preliminary commitment. If BUYER does not object,
BUYER shall be deemed to have accepted the conditions of the title. It is agreed
that if the title of said PROPERTY is not marketable, or cannot be made so within
ten (10) business days after notice containing a written statement of defect is
delivered to SELLER, then BUYER, at BUYER's option, may either :
(a) terminate this agreement by written notice to the SELLER, in which
BUYER's Earnest Money deposit shall be returned to BUYER and neither
party shall have any further rights, obligations or liabilities except as expressly
set forth in this Agreement; or (b) continue with this Agreement and, if closing
occurs, accept title subject to the uncured title defects other than monetary liens.
SELLER covenants and agrees that all monetary liens shall be removed by
SELLER at closing or insured against by the title insurer, whether or not BUYER
has designated such monetary liens as title defects.
(CR_000052, Exh. A,~ 12.) (Emphasis added).
"It is well established that specific provisions in a contract control over general provisions

where both relate to the same thing." Twin Lakes Vil/. Prop. Ass 'n, Inc. v. Crowley, 124 Idaho 132,
138, 857 P.2d 611, 617 (1993). Section 12 of the PSA provides the specific time frames and
procedure for objection to title issues. These specific time frames and procedure control over the
general provisions of due diligence found in paragraph 3 of Addendum No. 2.
The Agreement is ambiguous regarding whether Addendum No. 2 precludes the return of
earnest money in event of an objection to title after the due diligence period. There are genuine
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issues ofmaterial fact regarding the intent of the parties that the court erroneously failed to consider
because the court determined that the Agreement was not ambiguous and the court's granting of
summary judgment on this issue should be reversed.

B.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RIVER RANGE
WAIVED ITS RIGHT TO TERMINATE THE PURCHASE DUE TO THE LATE
RECEIPT OF THE PRELIMINARY TITLE COMMITMENT WHEN IT DID
NOT EXERCISE ITS TERMINATION RIGHT BY FEBRUARY 21, 2018.
The trial court held that River Range waived its right to terminate the purchase due to the
late receipt of the preliminary title commitment when it did not exercise its termination right by
February 21, 2018. This determination is fundamentally incorrect and as described above, the due
diligence deadline and the right to object to title issues are separate issues and provisions of the
agreement. By waiving the due diligence period, River Range did not invariably waive their right
to object to title issues as set forth in section 12 of the PSA. As separate provisions in the PSA
and Addendum No. 2, the right to the return of earnest money prior to the due diligence deadline
is separate and apart from the remedy of a return of the earnest money due to Citadel's failure to
convey marketable title under section 12 and 29 of the PSA.
Waiver is "the intentional relinquishment of a known right. It is a voluntary act and implies
election by a party to dispense with something of value or to forego some right or advantage which
he might at his option have demanded or insisted upon." Crouch v. Bischoff, 78 Idaho 364, 367,
304 P.2d 646, 649 (1956). Timothy Viole on behalf of River Range signed a waiver of Due
Diligence, he did not intend that to be a waiver of title issues but merely a waiver of general due
diligence. (CR_000127,

,r 6.)

River Range understood it was required to object to title issues
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within 15 business days of receiving the Preliminary Title Commitment pursuant to Section 12 of
the PSA, and they did do that. River Range timely objected in writing by letter dated March 12,
2018, to various conditions of the title. (CR_000074-77, Exh. E.) The title defects objected to by
River Range are substantial and include the existence of various easements and the encroachment
of buildings into those easements. River Range never intended and did not knowingly waive their
right to object to title issues when they waived the general due diligence. These are separate issues
and provisions in the PSA. At the very least, there are genuine issues of material fact with regard
to the knowledge and intent of River Range with respect to the title issues and summary judgment
was therefore inappropriate.

C.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CITADEL DID NOT
BREACH ITS DUTY TO ACT IN GOOD FAITH AND THAT ITS CONDUCT
DID NOT RISE TO A BREACH OF THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND
FAIR DEALING.
The lower court held that even assuming the alleged failures to act in good faith occurred,
Citadel did not breach its duty to act in good faith if it complied with the express terms of the
Contract. The trial court erred in their holding that the covenant to act is good faith was not
breached. Even after recognizing that: Citadel was aware of the title defects and did not disclose
them to River Range during negotiations; Citadel did not timely provide the preliminary title
commitment to River Range for its review; Citadel gave the impression it was willing to attempt
to resolve the title issues, River Range relied on such impression in spending money in pursuit of
the negotiations; and that Citadel made no attempt to resolve the undisclosed issues, the lower
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court held that Citadel complied with the agreement and therefore no breach of the duty to act in
good faith occurred.
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a covenant implied by law in the
parties' contract. Idaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738, 750, 9 P.3d 1204, 1216
(2000). Every contract contains a duty ofreasonable performance. Steiner v. Ziegler-Tamura Ltd.,
Co., 138 Idaho 238, 242, 61 P.3d 595, 599 (2002). Additionally, the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing is implied by law and "requires the parties to perform, in good faith, the obligations
required by their agreement[.]" Id. No covenant will be implied which is contrary to the terms of
the contract negotiated and executed by the parties. See First Sec. Bank of Idaho v. Gaige, 115
Idaho 172, 176, 765 P .2d 683, 687 (1988). The covenant requires that the parties perform, in good
faith, the obligations imposed by their agreement, and a violation of the covenant occurs only when
either party violates, nullifies or significantly impairs any benefit of the contract. See Idaho First
Nat. Bankv. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266,289,824 P.2d 841, 863 (1991).
River Range's claim for breach of the obligation of good faith and fair dealing is based, at
least in part, upon the purposeful delay in providing the title commitment, not upon a
representation or statement. Citadel were the owners of the Property and had a Preliminary Title
Commitment that showed significant title issues which would reasonably be expected to be issues
for a potential buyer of the Property. (CR_000127,

11

5 and 7.) Citadel withheld that Title

Commitment until shortly before the general due diligence period for the Property was set to
expire. (CR_000025, 113.)
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The covenant requires that the parties perform, in good faith, the obligations imposed by
their agreement. Citadel did not perform its obligations under the agreement. Citadel was obligated
to provide the title commitment to River range by January 29, 2018. It failed to do so. Citadel
knew of the title issues and had a title commitment as early as January 16, 2018, yet they did not
provide the title commitment to River Range until February 16, 2018, just five days before the due
diligence period was set to expire. Given the arguments made by Citadel in this case, it is
reasonable conclude that by delaying providing the title commitment, Citadel intended to reduce
the time for River Range to review the title commitment and any existing title issues. Such a move
by Citadel was a breach of the Implied Covenant of Goof Faith and Fair Dealing.
To the extent that Citadel attempted to challenge the claim in a substantive factual way, the
facts stated above were sufficient, given the obligation to construe the facts in favor of the nonmoving party, to defeat a claim on summary judgment on the merits of summary judgment and
therefore the lower court's decision should be overturned.

D.

THE COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES.

On July 29, 2019 the trial court entered its Order and Judgment RE: Defendant's
Memorandum of Costs and Fees. River range asserts that the judgment of the lower court
dismissing the claims should be reversed. Such reversal would require that the judgment and order
awarding attorney fees be vacated.

E.

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL.

If River Range prevails on this appeal, it seeks an award of the fees incurred in this appeal.
The Purchase and Sale Agreement between the parties that is the subject ofthis litigation contains
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a specific provision regarding the recovery of costs and attorney's fees. Paragraph 31 of the
Agreement states: "If either party initiates or defends any arbitration or legal action or
proceedings which are in any way connected with this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be
entitled to recover from the non-prevailing party reasonable costs and attorney's fees,
including such costs and fees on appeal."

V.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, River Range requests that the Court:
a. Reverse the summary judgment dismissing the claims against Citadel
Storage, LLC;
b. Vacate the judgments entered in this matter (including the judgments for
attorney fees) and remand the matter for new trial against Citadel Storage,
LLC.
c. Award costs and attorney fees to Appellant.
DATED this 18th day of September, 2019.
ANGSTMAN JOHNSON --"

By:/s/ J. Justin May
J. JUSTIN MAY
BRANDEN M. HUC~TEP
Attorneys for Appellant
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)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned, a resident attorney of the State of Idaho, hereby certifies that on the 18th
day of September, 2019 he caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to be served
upon the following by email:

Thomas E. Dvorak
Jason J. Blakley
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 West Bannock Street
Boise, ID 83702
tedservice@givenspurslev.com
iasonblaklev@givenspurslev.com
Attorneys for Respondent

[ ] U.S. Mail Postage Paid
[ ] Hand Delivered
[ ] Fax Transmittal
[x] iCourt Notification

Isl J. Justin May
J. Justin May
Attorney for Appellant
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